4 orders · Page 1 of 1
The High Court held that the substantial question of law is answered against the assessees and in favour of the revenue. The Tribunal, while dismissing the appeal, specifically held that the investment made by the assessee had not been disclosed in earlier assessment years. It further relied on Section 158BB(2) of the Act, which states that in computing undisclosed income for the block period, the provisions of Sections 68, 69, 69A, 69B, and 69C apply, and references to financial years shall be construed as references to the relevant previous year falling within the block period. The Tribunal noted that the assessee was found to be the owner of the valuable article (share certificates) and the investment amount is deemed income in the financial year it was found. The Court found that the assessee had not placed any evidence to establish that the investment was made in 1994. The initial burden lies on the assessee to prove such a claim. The findings of fact by the authorities were based on meticulous appreciation of evidence and could not be termed perverse. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed.
The High Court allowed the application for withdrawal of the main appeal. The Court reasoned that the assessee wished to avail the Direct Tax Vivad-Se-Vishwas Act, 2020, to settle its tax disputes. Since the revenue had no objection to this application, the Court granted the permission. Consequently, the main appeal (ITA-178-2012) was dismissed as having been withdrawn. Any pending Civil Miscellaneous Applications related to the main appeal were also disposed of. The Court did not decide on the merits of the original appeal.
The High Court allowed the revenue's request to withdraw the appeal. The court noted that the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the appellant (revenue) sought leave to withdraw the appeal in light of Circular No. 09/2024 dated 17.09.2024. This withdrawal was sought with the liberty to revive the appeal if the subject matter of the appeal fell within the exceptions provided in Circular No. 5/2024 dated 15.03.2024. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn in terms of the liberty prayed for. Miscellaneous applications, if any, were also stated to stand closed. No order as to costs was made.
The High Court held that the Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused by failing to properly appreciate the evidence and consider the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act. The Court found that the accused had not rebutted the presumption of consideration in favor of the complainant. The evidence of DW.2, the bank manager, did not falsify the complainant's case. The Court concluded that the complainant had satisfactorily proved the borrowing of Rs. 12,00,000/-, the issuance of the cheque in consideration, the dishonor, and the failure to reply to the notice. The accused's defense was deemed false and without basis. The Trial Court's judgment was set aside as illegal, erroneous, and perverse. The appeal was allowed, the acquittal judgment was set aside, and the accused was convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act. The accused was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 12,25,000/-, with Rs. 12,00,000/- to be paid as compensation to the complainant and Rs. 25,000/- to the state. In default of fine payment, the accused was to undergo simple imprisonment for one year. The Court noted the object of the NI Act amendment was to honor cheque transactions and provide sanctity to them.